By Robert Margarian
Last week, two major events shaped Armenia’s domestic political landscape:
The leaders of both the opposition and the ruling party made public appearances—one through a press conference and the other via an “ideological discourse.”
After two and a half years of silence, Armenia’s second president and the leader of the Hayastan (Armenia) Alliance, Robert Kocharyan, held a highly anticipated press conference. The level of interest was evident, with over one million views recorded on a single Armenian news outlet.
During the press conference, Kocharyan addressed his extended absence from the public sphere, explaining that he had deliberately stepped back to allow new opposition forces to emerge and take the lead. However, he noted, that never materialized. He also responded to recent claims that he had negotiated a territorial exchange of Meghri for Artsakh in the late 1990s. Kocharyan unequivocally denied these allegations, emphasizing—particularly in response to a question from Azatutyun Radio (Radio Liberty)—that their recently published report contained no new revelations. He pointed out that he had already covered this issue in detail years ago in his memoir.
Kocharyan also made it clear that if removing Nikol Pashinyan from power proves impossible and the country faces either regular or snap elections, his team will fully participate with all its strength.
Addressing Armenia-Diaspora relations, Kocharyan stated:
“Armenia must return to its previous approach when it comes to the Diaspora. Armenia with the Diaspora and Armenia without the Diaspora are in completely different weight classes.”
It is undeniable that Armenia-Diaspora relations are currently at their weakest point in the 34-year history of the Republic of Armenia. The situation has deteriorated to the extent that no government representative—whether the prime minister, cabinet members, or ministers—can meaningfully engage with broad sections of the Armenian Diaspora. Particularly after the 44-day war, whenever Armenian government officials visit foreign countries, their meetings with local Armenian communities are held behind closed doors, with only pre-selected and vetted attendees allowed. Meanwhile, the chief commissioner for Diaspora affairs—whose primary mission should be strengthening Armenia-Diaspora ties—has, through his statements and actions, instead contributed to further division within the Diaspora.
The second major event of the week was Nikol Pashinyan’s so-called “ideological discourse.” Apart from a specific announcement about a referendum on Armenia’s Constitution, his speech offered nothing new—it was mostly a rehash of ideas he had already expressed in previous meetings or Facebook posts both in Armenia and abroad.
Each of the 14 points Pashinyan presented as pillars of a “national ideology” could be thoroughly dissected in separate articles, but given Robert Kocharyan’s emphasis on Armenia-Diaspora relations, it is worth drawing a direct comparison to a particularly revealing—and concerning—statement Pashinyan made during his speech.
Pashinyan introduced a new distinction between the terms “nation” (azg) and “people” (zhoghovurd). According to his definition, the “Armenian Nation” consists of all Armenians worldwide, while the “Armenian People” refers specifically to the citizens of the Republic of Armenia—those who founded the state and have voting rights.
Why Pashinyan chose to redefine these terms is likely tied to recent statements from Azerbaijan, which has expressed a desire to sign a peace agreement not with Pashinyan personally but with the “Armenian People.” Traditionally, the term “Armenian People” has been understood to include all Armenians worldwide. Under that definition, meeting Azerbaijan’s demand would be impossible. Leaving aside the practical question of how one would even attempt to gauge the views of the global Armenian population, Pashinyan has undoubtedly encountered resistance during his international visits—realizing that he cannot secure broad Diasporan support for his approach to peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey. To sidestep this obstacle, he has effectively redefined the “Armenian People,” limiting it to only those who hold voting rights in Armenia. Convincing this restricted group to accept peace with Azerbaijan is far easier and more manageable.
The dangers of Pashinyan’s new definition of the “Armenian People” need little explanation. Under this framework, any legal resident of Armenia who meets the requirements for citizenship automatically becomes part of the “Armenian People.” Meanwhile, an Armenian living in the Diaspora without Armenian citizenship ceases to be considered part of the “Armenian People” and is relegated to the status of a member of the “Armenian Nation”—a distinction with significant implications. The real danger of this approach becomes evident when considering that key decisions regarding Armenia’s Constitution—and possibly Pashinyan’s broader ideological agenda—will be made not by the actual Armenian people, but by the artificially redefined “Armenian People” as dictated by Pashinyan. This could include individuals who have obtained Armenian citizenship but have no connection to Armenian history, culture, or national values. Notably, Pashinyan himself addressed this very point during his speech.
In summary, analyzing the statements—both direct and indirect—of Armenia’s former and current leaders regarding Armenia-Diaspora relations, a clear contrast emerges. While Kocharyan views strong ties with the Diaspora as essential and believes that Armenia, with the support of the Diaspora, becomes more powerful and influential on the world stage, Pashinyan, in pursuit of a false peace agenda with Azerbaijan and to appease Aliyev’s demands, is actively deepening divisions among Armenians. By distancing the Diaspora from Armenia, he is weakening the very entity that gives Armenia its weight in the international arena—the Diaspora itself.
This article was was translated by Oragark from its original in Armenian to English
